India’s One China Policy May Not be Permanent Feature Amid Beijing’s Aggression

Amid the stand-off and high tension across the Line of Actual Control, prominent Indian strategic experts have explored possible options that India can pursue to send strong messages to Beijing. Law and Society Alliance and Defense Capital jointly organised a webinar on the topic “Revisiting ‘One China’ policy: Economic and Political Options for India: Hong Kong, Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang” on Friday. The speakers at the event were: President of Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, Jayadeva Ranade; Secretary General of Forum for Integrated National Secretary, Sheshadri Chari; Director of Vivekananda International Foundation Dr. Arvind Gupta; Editor of Strat News Global and Bharat Shakti, Nitin Gokhale; and Senior Fellow at Peace and Conflict Studies, Abhijit Iyer Mitra.

Arvind Gupta began by defining the idea of One China Policy and argued that it should mean that there should be reciprocity in all the areas between the two countries. He expressed his concerns about not taking a dynamic approach beyond the statements. On Tibet, he suggested that India should be supporting Tibet and try that the Dalai Lama should be given a higher position and more visibility in India’s political circles. Along with this, India must begin economic and technological engagements with Taiwan, besides supporting it politically.

He also recommended garnering India’s support to the democratic movement in Hong Kong, even if Delhi is not part of joint statement by the West. He also talked about raising the issue of human rights violations in Xinjiang at global platforms. He also stressed the need to build India’s own capacity on dealing with China and start anticipating steps that China could take in case India start deviating from One China Policy. This needs to give an entire rethink on the entire policy on China, which needs to be modified. “We also need to think whether we should go at once or gradually work towards it?”, he said.

The arguments of Gokhale revolved largely around Taiwan and Tibet. Exploring India’s policy options on Taiwan he said, “Taiwan is the low hanging fruit as far as a rethink on One China Policy is concerned. We should think of increasing sour economic and technological relations with Taiwan. They are wonderful in electronic chip manufacturing, semiconductors, 5G, etc.. Taiwan is a master in these areas. India’s trade with Taiwan has moved from 66 Million Dollars to 6 Billion Dollars in the past few years. 90 Taiwanese firms are operating in India. There is some direction towards our Taiwan policy, as we have recently set up a separate desk on Taiwan Invest Organisation within the Commerce Ministry. Also, in two instances, Indian MPs have attended the PMs inauguration ceremony in Taiwan. India is on the verge of a policy change towards One China Policy towards Taiwan. The straits nation can help us train more and more students, government officials, technocrats and teach them Mandarin to help Indian stakeholders study and understand China more.”

On Tibet, he said that not only the Dalai Lama but the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan Government in Exile should be provided greater visibility amongst the media, academia, and government events/meetings. Besides, Buddhist diplomacy should be integral to India’s China policy. “One of the strongest points India has is the roots and familiarity with Buddhist traditions. We should leverage it. Setting up Buddhist Alliance in countries of South Asia and Southeast Asia would be fruitful. India should think about passively helping Tibetans to organise protests when Chinese leaders visit India”, he added. Talking about the worries of China, he said that three Ts bother China the most: Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen/Trade.

Ranade stressed the need to build up India’s own capabilities in countering China – not only on the border, but the need to take them on all other fronts. He predicted that the tensions between the US and China will certainly either put India in a sweet or in a delicate position in the time to come. Backing Gokhale’s views about Mandarin, he recommended that since a large number of our students go to China and come back with a sort of pronounced bias in favour of Beijing, if not brainwashed by them, why should we not shift away from China and shift that cohort of students to Taiwan? They will return back learning classical China, they will come back as fluent speakers. They won’t be brainwashed and influenced by China as well. He said that the government should take up the issue and think about how to fund scholarships for students going there.

Ranade also advocated that the Dalai Lama needs to be given more prominence on major platforms. He should be photographed more with more Indian Ministers. “Tibet touches us because of Buddhism. We are entering a delicate status with Dali Lama’s advancing age. Dalai Lama’s advantage is to be taken for two reasons. Firstly, to bring China on backfoot in terms of Buddhist leadership. China does not have a good track record on this. Second, we need to build up our own Buddhist religious sites as it is one of the fastest-growing religions of the world. Thereby, bringing all the Asian countries business to India. We should also try to link Lumbini with Gaya, Sarnath, and other Buddhist sites in India. We need to prevent China from building the Buddist circuit connecting Lumbini with China through aerial connectivity.”

Sheshadri Chari presented an insightful view of Xinjiang. He began by explaining the nuances to terminologies. He said that China doesn’t use the One China Policy, instead, it uses the term – ‘One China Principle’. Going deep into history, he said that in 1949, China annexed Xinjiang, which was a strategic move. Uger/Uyghur was its real name and it wasn’t called Xinjiang for a long time. In Chinese terminology, the word Xinjiang literally means borderland or new frontier. Chinese admit themselves that it is not their land. In 1955, they converted the new province into the ‘Autonomous Region’. Saifuddin Azizi was the chairman of the autonomous territory and opposed Mao Zedong’s terminology of Xinjiang, which was later named Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Questioning why Xinjiang is important, he explained its strategic importance. He said, “By occupying Tibet, China occupied an additional landmass and got borders with India, Bhutan, and Nepal, which they did not had. Because of occupying Xinjiang, they got direct borders with India (Aksai Chin), Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Russia, Pakistan, Tibet, Afghanistan, and Kazakhstan. It was an important strategic move by China. The development of Urumqi-Kashgar road, an all-weather road, China will get access to South Asia. Kashgar is a part of the Karakoram range. The road goes through Gilgit Baltistan (GB), connecting it to Islamabad.

China would further be able to create a road from Galwan valley to GB. It will join the Kashgar-Islamabad road in GB. So that GB becomes the central part of CPEC. All these areas are a part of POJK, or India. Thus, China will be making a road in Indian territory to dominate the region. India should be more concerned about the scope and range of the One China Policy. It also has significance as far as its relation with Tibet, outer Mongolia, and Xinjiang is concerned. “What can be done? We should not engage in a barter system with China on One India and One China Policies. Even if you don’t accept, One India policy or not, we will not accept the One China Policy at all”, Sheshadri Chari stressed.

Mitra’s arguments revolved around suggestions for the future course of action. He began by classifying three major problems of India with China – cutting off the Pakistan-China nexus, the need for a problems free border, and China’s veto power at UNSC. He also requested the policymakers to think about two major questions. First, what can we do to them, that they can not do to us? Second, what can we do to them, that they have done to us in the past? There could be consequences.

He flagged a couple of questions “are we ready to give nuclear weapons to Taiwan? Can we support Taiwan strategically? Can we support the democracy movement in Hong Kong? Can we recognise Taiwan? Can we support Uighurs? Can we support Manchuria and Inner Mongolia? Can we support the minority rebels in Mongolia? Can we sell them weapons? The answer is always covert, covert, and covert!” Highlighting the difference between covert and overt policies, he said that Indians are strategically schizophrenic and French are strategically ambiguous.

He advocated a long-term policy and said that it cannot be bargaining, it needs to be policy. Exploring policy options, he suggested developing Intelligence cooperation with Taiwanese, who have excellent counterintelligence capabilities and brilliant technological intelligence. “We should encourage these “trade ties” with Taiwan, similar to those that China in India in the guise of trade. Similarly, Taiwan has much better access and development in technology with China. Chinese technology is at a much lower level in fundamental terms than Taiwanese. We should ensure that middle-level manufacturing moves away from China to Taiwan.”

Mitra also recommended diverting Chinese attention to the South China Sea and other borders by providing resources and support to countries like Vietnam and Philippines, who are ready to take on China. He said that Vietnam needs western technologies, but has a trust deficiency towards the West. India should act as a platform for the transfer of Western tech to Vietnam. He also argued about the need to have clarity on alliances and suggested moving away from non-aligned movement’s different versions. What is the problem in building a doctrinal relationship with Japanese and US forces, he questioned.

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Source: ET (Published with Edits)

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